

Compatibilism as Basis for Human Freedom

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Abstract

Freedom is an essential idea we ache for; it is additionally one vocal topic which is central to our human rights. Both communism and democracy promises freedom. Also, our trending ideology, post-modernity approves it strongly, even though some scholars still think the idea of freedom in a strict sense as impossible. Jean Paul Sartre believed that man is absolutely free to do whatsoever he wants to do, which represents many scholars' definition of freedom. This definition of freedom is problematic because to some extent man's action can be pre-determined, corresponding to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's claims that "Man is born free, and everywhere in chains." How then do we reconcile the notion of determinism and freedom? This paper questions the idea of absolute freedom and argues that it cannot be actualized in human existence. This paper contends in favors of compatibilism, which presuppose a center gathering for both freewill and determinism.

Keywords: Freedom, determinism, compatibilism, soft determinism, conditional necessity

INTRODUCTION

It can be claimed that Jean Paul Sartre stretched the boundary of human freedom beyond its elastic limit. As an existentialist, Sartre claimed that man is absolutely free in his course of action. His conception of human freedom as absolute has attracted the criticism of philosophers and scholars alike. Can man they claimed be totally responsible for all his actions? Can we even say in a less significant sense that some actions of *le pour-soi* (Being-in-itself) are not determined? Does it mean that all the actions of being-for-itself are absolutely free that he has to take absolute responsibility for them? Is he responsible for both himself and for the world? These are relays of questions arising from the degree to which Sartre conceived freedom. Some scholars argued that freedom cannot be absolute. In effect, they opined that freedom has its own limitations. Man, they say, even though free, is not free in all situations. In a sense, therefore, Jean-Jacque Rousseau's assertion is true here: "man is born free and he is everywhere in chains" (O'Malley, 2007). Does this thinking not presuppose a contradiction and is it not against Aristotelian law of non-contradiction? Can someone be free and also in chain at the same time? Does this really presuppose freedom? This is a debate that touches ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of law, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion. There is need for a compatibilistic theory because determinism is a foundational issue. This is because the questions it raises, if not the answers, provide far reaching consequences for the sciences and human life more generally.

The Problem of Freedom

All through mankind's history, freedom has been the most vital and testing desire to reach. Our ancestors battled for political freedom from the oppression of oppressors, slaves battled for freedom and uniformity, and women battled for freedom from their stereotypical "family unit

obligations" and their entitlement to vote. When asked what freedom means, individuals may have a troublesome time concocting a solid definition. The normal answer of "freedom means doing whatever I need, at whatever point I need" (Wreathall, 2009, p. 493) produces many clashing inquiries. As indicated by Albert Einstein, "All religions, expressions and sciences are branches of a similar tree. Every one of these desires is coordinated toward recognizing man's life, lifting it from the circle of simple physical presence and driving the person towards freedom" (Kröner, 1953, p. 63). Shockingly, the utilization of "freedom" has been misunderstood because of the absence of a profound and careful cognizance of its actual importance. For example the main implications of freedom for most young people is to go out uninhibitedly, have a "cool" life and experience every one of the things that may appear to be questionable for them (drink liquor, encounter sex, attempt cannabis, etc.). Many individuals claim to bolster freedom however the issue is that so few of them comprehend the genuine significance of the word. Freedom is basically like everything else in this world – the thing we make of it. Wright Mills is of the opinion that "Freedom is not simply the chance to do however one sees fit; it is just the chance to pick between set options. Freedom is, as a matter of first importance, the opportunity to figure the accessible decisions, to contend over them and after that, the chance to pick" (Wiley, 1962, p.10). Consider the possibility that one's "free" activities are destructive to others. Would it be a good idea for him to then still have the freedom to continue acting that way? Freedom, many people trust, is too much hypothetical of an idea, making it difficult to be described exactly and unequivocally. For the Al Qaeda, freedom from the American dominion must be taken by force and by undertaking terrorist attacks against regular citizens. The thought that somebody can be totally free is crazy.

More often than not, one individual's freedom is someone else's limitation. Debates about freewill have been affected by both religion and science. On the scientific front, issues about freedom will have led to questions about the nature of the physical universe and our place in it. Is it exact to state that we are directed by physical laws and advancements of the atoms, about human psychology and the springs of action? Can our activities be anticipated by the individuals who know our psychology, and about social molding? Is it true that we are

resolved to be the sorts of people we are by heredity and condition, birth and childhood? In philosophy, discussion about freedom has prompted issues about wrongdoing and discipline, blameworthiness and obligation, intimidation and control, psyche and body, need and probability, time and possibility, good and bad, and substantially more. In outcome, the unrestrained choice issue can be said not to be fitted effortlessly into one territory of philosophy. It touches all branches of philosophy. Another way to the freewill issue is the thought of obligation which is firmly joined to freedom. They walk hand in hand. This is on the grounds that freewill is personally identified with thoughts of responsibility, blameworthiness, and excellence for activities. Other critical issues to ask about freewill incorporate if child rearing and society, hereditary makeup and childhood all have an impact on us, what we get to be, and do they deliberate to us with extreme duty (Raymond & Tompa, 1987, p.152). To perceive reasons why numerous people have accepted there is a contention between freewill and determinism, consider what freedom requires. We trust we have choice when we see ourselves as specialists equipped for impacting the world in different ways. Open alternatives seem to lie before us. We reason and deliberate among them and choose. We feel it is 'up to us' what we choose and how we act; and this means we could have chosen or acted otherwise. Aristotle is known for saying, "when acting is 'up to us,' so is not acting" (Um, 2010, p.135). This 'up-to-us-ness' additionally recommends that a definitive wellspring of our actions lies in us and not outside us in factors outside our ability to control. On the off chance that Jane trusts her decision is a free decision, made of her own freedom," she should accept both alternatives are "open" to her while she is thinking. She could pick the one that is possible. (On the off chance that she didn't trust this, what might be the purpose of pondering?) But that implies she accepts there is more than one conceivable way into the future accessible to her and it is "dependent upon her" which of these ways will be taken. Such a photograph of an open future with forking ways, a garden of forking ways, as it has been called, is a key to our cognizance of freedom. This photo of various conceivable ways into what's to come is additionally basic to being a man and to carry on with an existence. One can see why determinism would threaten this picture. On the off chance that

determinism is valid, it appears there would not be more than one conceivable way into the future accessible to Jane, however just a single way. It likewise appears that, if determinism was valid, the sources or roots of her activities would not be in Jane herself but rather in something else outside her control that decided her decision (such as the decrees of fate, the foreordaining acts of God, her heredity and upbringing or social conditioning).

THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINISM

Determinism is the hypothesis about the world that all occasions in it no matter what are impacts, occasions required by prior occasions. Henceforth, any occasion of any sort is an impact of an earlier arrangement of impacts, setting up a causal chain (Weber, 2001, p.220). If this theory is true, future events are as fixed and unalterable as the past is fixed and unalterable. One graphic description of determinism is in terms of what William James called “the iron block universe”: “those parts of the universe already laid down” he wrote, “appoint and decree what other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality” (Weinberger, 2000, p.440). Doctrines of determinism have taken many historical forms. People have wondered at different times whether their choices and actions might be determined by fate or by God, by laws of physics or laws of logic, by heredity and environment, by unconscious motives or psychological or social conditioning, and so on. But there is a core idea running through all historical doctrines of determinism that reveals why they are a threat to free will, whether the doctrines are fatalistic, theological, logical, physical, psychological, or social. According to this core idea:

An event (such as a choice or action) is determined when there are conditions obtaining earlier (such as the decrees of fate or the foreordaining acts of God or antecedent causes plus laws of nature) whose occurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event. In other words, it must be the case that, if these earlier determining conditions obtain, then the determined event will occur. (Kane, 2005, p. 9)

It must be noted that a determined event is inevitable or necessary (it cannot but occur) given the determining conditions. Determinism is thus

a kind of necessity, a conditional necessity. A determined event does not have to occur; no matter what else happens it need not be absolutely necessary. But it must occur when the determining conditions have occurred (Hoefer, 2010, p.9). Determinism puts in doubts all life-hopes, personal feelings, knowledge, moral responsibility, the rightness of actions, and the moral standing of persons. Others have pointed out that if determinism is true, no one could ever rationally deliberate about any type of action. Deliberation, it is said, makes sense only if genuine alternatives are available to us. If one deliberates about whether or not to raise his arm, his deliberation is rational only if he or she is able to raise it or not. If determinism is true, only one cause of actions is genuinely open to us. So, it is alleged that one's deliberation will be irrational (Hoefer, 2010, p.10). There are two horns of the dilemma in determinism. The discovering of causal explanations for our action, preferences and decisions shows that we could not have done other than we have done, that responsibility is an illusion and the moral life as traditionally conceived a charade. It makes praise and blame irrelevant, except in so far as we discover these to be causally effective, and while the moral judgments of agents might therefore retain some point, those of spectators and critics would be pointless. We may find it difficult to believe that moral praise and blame are appropriate only because and in so far as we are ignorant; or rather, that they are not, but only seem appropriate. But to react against this is to discover that the other horn of the dilemma is equally menacing for the only possible alternative seems to be a pious hope that psychological and sociological explanation should in fact prove impossible. To believe that human behaviour is inexplicable is to offend against all that we have learned from the successive victories of the sciences. David Hume equally highlighted this side of the dilemma:

What would become of history had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience, which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ

our criticism upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct (Pompa, 2003, p.135).

The truth is that philosophers have cared less about whether or not the rest of the universe is determined; what they are concerned about is whether or not our lives are determined. Indeed, determinism has often been taken as the more limited claim that all our choices, decisions, intentions, mental events, and all our actions are no more than effects of other equally necessitated events. The problem of determinism in this delineated form is identical with the problem of freedom, or the free will problem. It seems then from the above that determinism cannot be renounced, yet it is incompatible with human freedom. This brings us to the compatibilistic thesis, a reconciliation of both the problem of determinism and freewill.

WHAT IS COMPATIBILISM?

Compatibilism is the view that there is really no conflict between determinism and free will, that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, that is, they are compatible. There are different types of Compatibilism, which varies in the lent of agreeability between freewill and determinism. Compatibilism has become an increasingly popular doctrine in modern philosophy because it provides what seems to be a neat, simple solution to the free will problem (Vilhauer, 2004, p.710). Its most crucial claim is that human freedom can exist together with determinism with no legitimate disagreement. In the event that there truly is no contention between freedom and determinism, as compatibilists say, then the well-established issue of choice is settled in a single killer blow; however, that is not the situation as there are as yet numerous contentions to discredit that. How can we, as humans, be determined and free at the same time? The reasoning is truly problematic. Compatibilism was held by some antiquated thinkers, similar to the Stoics and Aristotle as well, as indicated by a few

researchers. But it has become especially popular since the seventeenth century in the face of the new Newtonian sciences with its mechanistic and deterministic worldview (Richard, 1991, p.270). Compelling philosophers of the modern period, for example, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and John Stuart Mill, were all compatibilists. They saw compatibilism as a way of reconciling ordinary experience of being free with scientific views about the universe and human beings. Compatibilism remains popular among philosophers and scientists today for similar reasons. On the off chance that compatibilists are correct, we can have both freedom and determinism, and need not stress that future science will by one means or another undermine our common conviction that we are free and responsible agents. This is a comforting thought. But is compatibilism believable? Most persons resist the idea that free will and determinism might be compatible when they first encounter it. The idea that determinism might be compatible with freedom and responsibility looks at first like a “wretched subterfuge” (Stone, 2000, p.1583) as Kant called the compatibilism of Hobbes and Hume. Are these claims true? If compatibilism is to be taken seriously by ordinary persons, they have to be talked out of this natural belief in the incompatibility of free will and determinism by means of philosophical arguments; and supplying such arguments is what compatibilists try to do. Thomas Hobbes was a key component in developing the compatibilist theory, and he defined freedom as ‘acting in the absence of external impediments...so that a man could do as he will, and forbear as he will. Hume considered freedom to be the “force of acting as indicated by the conclusions of the will: that is, whether we stay very still we may; in the event that we move, we likewise may” (Norton, 2008). We are free unless we are forced into actions against our will, like Hume said, a ‘prisoner in chains’ is unable to choose to unshackle himself, it is likewise pushed by current philosophers, including influential Daniel Dennett. A stream that streams down a slope fundamentally takes after a channel, yet it is additionally at freedom to stream inside the channel. The willful activities of individuals are comparable. They are free on the grounds that their activities take after from their will; yet the activities are likewise fundamental since they spring from chains of circumstances and end results which could on a basic level be followed back to the primary

mover of the universe, for the most part called God. So on this view, to be at freedom is just to not be physically limited as opposed to be uncaused. For Hobbes, to be free is to go about as we will, and to be un-free is to be pressured by others. Hume was likewise a compatibilist (Russell, 2007). He said that we reason that nature is brimming with need, in that we gather that one thing takes after another from need. We additionally realize that individuals have a nature, and that their activities take after from their tendency. We act on the planet from thought processes, for example, aspiration or friendship, and history shows us this was generally so. When individuals' thought and intentions are not understandable, our experience would not help us in our dealings with them. Individuals are genuinely comparable and we can likewise come to comprehend the subtleties of the characters of specific individuals. It can be hard to perceive any reason why somebody accomplished something, however then it can likewise be hard to perceive any reason why a machine quit working. This does not imply that there was no reason. We acknowledge that carriages are instruments, yet in the event of anything the drivers are more solid than the carriages. Some of the time the carriages separate, however the drivers dependably wish to be paid. We act in the world from motives such as ambition or friendship, and history teaches us that this was always so. If people's motives were not understandable, our experience would not help us in our dealings with them. People are fairly similar and we can also come to understand the nuances of the characters of particular people. It can be difficult to see why someone did something, but then it can also be difficult to see why a machine stopped working. This does not mean that there was no reason. We accept that carriages are mechanisms, but the drivers are more reliable than the carriages. Sometimes the carriages break down but the drivers always wish to be paid. Obviously, as people, when we embrace an activity from some thought process, we envision that in the very same conditions we could have accomplished something else. We do not think we act out of necessity. However, as Hume notes, in the event that we attempt to demonstrate our outright freedom by accomplishing something "unpredictable" then we are as yet acting from a clear rationale: our motive is the desire not to be seen to act from predictable thought processes (Falk, 1975, p.7). When we look at other individuals and

neglect to foresee their conduct, especially somebody we know well, then we accept that we are uninformed about some reality, and that their conduct is on a fundamental level comprehensible and unsurprising, instead of that the individual has all of a sudden turned out to be vast. For Hume and different compatibilists, freedom means being free to go about as we will, yet this does not imply that our activities appear suddenly: our interests, thought processes and cravings furnish us with the motivation which our reason (judiciousness) tries to fulfill. To be at freedom cannot mean acting without a rationale, since that is the meaning of frantiness. Dennett shields this wide proposal of inspired freedom with a scope of fascinating contentions. For Dennett there is additionally an important refinement amongst determinism and certainty. The Earth, for instance, has experienced a current blast of 'evitability', when it may have been in evitable that the Earth ought to be struck by a space rock. Be that as it may, the planet has, maybe deterministically, advanced people who may possibly devastate an approaching rock. It is no longer unavoidable, so it is evitable reason (Stich, 1981, p.45). Similarly, it is not inescapable that those arranged to coronary illness will go ahead to create it. We have, maybe deterministically, delivered a comprehension of the reasons for heart diseases, and we can alter our conduct on this premise. Once more, what was once inescapable is no longer so. So we might not have what Dennett calls 'behavioral choice', the total and unobstructed God-like capacity to pick out of nothing; however, we can adaptably react to and change our condition, a domain that in addition to other things contains information of how other individuals have acted and thought.

FURTHER DEFENCE OF COMPATIBILISTIC THEORY

The first step in compatibilists' argument is to ask us to reflect on what we ordinarily mean by saying actions or choices are "free." What does it mean to say I am free to go to work this morning? It does not mean I will actually go to work, for one may choose not to. But I am free to go to work if I have the power or ability to go to work, should I want or decide to do so. Freedom then is, first of all, a power or ability to do something, a power I may or may not choose to exercise. Second, this power or capacity, which is my freedom, involves that there are no requirements or obstacles keeping me from doing what I need to do. I

would not be free to go to work this morning if various things stopped me, for example, being in prison or on the off chance that somebody had tied me up (physical restriction), or on the off chance that somebody was holding me at gunpoint, summoning me not to move (coercion), or if I was paralyzed (lack of ability), or all the buses were not running today or they were on strike (lack of opportunity), or if fear of crowded buses compelled me to avoid them (compulsion), and so on. In this manner freedom, as it is stated, is first the power or capacity to do what we need or yearn to do, which thus involves a nonappearance of limitations or obstacles, (for example, physical restrictions, pressure, and impulse) keeping us from doing what we need. Most traditional compatibilists, such as Hobbes, Hume, and Mill, were compatibilists in this sense. Hobbes stated the view succinctly, saying a man is free when he finds “no stops in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do.” What's more, Hobbes noticed that if this is the thing that freedom implies, then freedom is good with determinism. For, as he put it, there might be no limitations or obstructions keeping people from doing what they “will or yearning to do, regardless of the possibility that it ought to turn out that what they will or craving was controlled by their past”(Hobbes, 1958, p.108). Additionally, Hobbes noticed that if this is the thing that freedom implies, then freedom is perfect with determinism, for, as he put it, there may be no constraints or impediments preventing persons from doing what they “will or desire to do,” even if it should turnout that their will or desire was determined by their past. This would also include the freedom to do otherwise. For this means, according to this classical notion, that one would have done so if one wanted to do so. Additionally it also means the freedom of will i.e. the freedom of choice or decision, which can be analyzed in the same way:

1. One has the power or ability to choose to do A;
2. No constraint would prevent one from making the choice, if one wanted to, and in addition, nothing would have prevented one from choosing otherwise (choosing not to do A), if one had wanted to choose otherwise.

Further, they say, freedom that is not the result of previous causal conditions is illusory and does not exist. In other words in determinism

same past but different futures is irrational. We cannot have that kind of ultimate control over our lives in any way, argues the compatibilists. Freedom from our background, and from the influences of the set of conditions imposed on us by the merits and demerits of our alternatives, is said to be a request to act arbitrarily, and this is no freedom. Compatibilist believes that much of the confusion about the conflict of determinism and free will stems not only from the confusion about freedom, but about determinism itself. Determinism, compatibilists insist, is not the frightful thing we think it is. People believe determinism is a threat to freedom because they commonly confuse determinism with a host of other things that are a threat to freedom. The concept of determinism is also widely misunderstood to be fatalism and vice versa but nothing is farther from the truth. Submission to the inevitable Fatalism is the view that whatever happens will happen, regardless of what we do. Determinism alone does not suggest such an outcome. Our choices, actions, and inactions have enormous consequences on how things turn out eventually. This vital point was made by another powerful established compatibilist, John Stuart Mill:

A fatalist believes...not only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of causes that precede it [which is what determinists believe], but moreover that there is no use in struggling against it; that it will happen however we may strive to prevent it....[Thus, fatalists believe that a man's] character is formed *for* him, and not *by* him; therefore his wishing it was formed differently is of no use; he has no power to alter it. This is a grand error. He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character. Its not being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed by him as one of the immediate agents. His character is formed *by* his circumstances...but his own desire to mold it in a particular way is one of those circumstances, and by no means the least influential. (Mill, 1846, p.593)

Not infrequently a sick man may excuse himself for not seeing a doctor: "If your time is up, it doesn't matter what you do about it," he may say. Also a soldier may use a similar line of reasoning for not taking precautions: "There's a bullet out there with your name on it.

When it comes, you will not be able to avoid it, no matter what you do.” However, the cases of the sick man and the soldier are in actuality cases of what the philosophers called the “lazy sophism.” The proper answers to the sick man and the soldier would be, “Whether your time is now up may depend in a great part on whether you see a doctor; and whether any bullet out there right now has your name on it may depend on what precautions you take. So instead of sitting around doing nothing, see a doctor and take precaution” (Kane, 2005, p.93). In the same breath, determinism does not imply mechanism. It does not imply a mechanical, inflexible, or automatic behaviour of machine or the instinctive behaviors of some lower creatures. For unlike machines, humans have a conscious inner life of moods and motives, and unlike the lower creatures, we have judgment and the capacity for deliberation (Kane, 2005, p. 93). It is said that just as freedom is the opposite of constraint, coercion, and compulsion, so does determinism. Obviously these demonstrates against our wills keeping us from doing or picking what we want. By differentiation, determinism does not really act against our wills; nor does it generally keep us from doing what we need. Causal determinism, to be sure, does mean that all events follow from earlier events in accordance with invariable laws of nature. But this does not necessarily constrain us. Some causes (such as muscular strength) enhance our freedom, while other causes (i.e., constraints) hinder our freedom. A compatibilist acknowledges the hard determinist's philosophical hypothesis of universal causation – everything is brought on by a progression of occasions, additionally separates amongst inner and outside causes, bringing about the conviction of good duty and constrained freewill.

Internal Causes refer to actions caused as result of inner wishes and desires. These are the results of freewill. For example, I leave the country because I desire to go abroad.

External Causes refer to those actions we are forced to take because of external influences, for example I leave the country because I am forced to by the Government.

It is the qualification between these two sorts of causes which clarifies why compatibilists require through and through freedom. When a compatibilist speaks of acting with free-will, he means when he

acts, he acts as per his inclination, however not as indicated by outer weights constrained upon his circumstance. This is known as the “liberty of spontaneity,” and is central to the soft determinist theory. In spite of the fact that our tendencies are resolved remotely by variables depicted in mental determinism, family, society, and condition for instance, but we still have freewill since we have the freedom of spontaneity. Our decisions are chosen by our inclination and condition; yet, which alternative we take is chosen by our freewill. It is a further mixed up presumption, contends the compatibilists, to envision that when we act or pick openly as per our wills, our activities are altogether uncaused. On the contrary, our free actions are caused by our characters and motives; and this is a good thing. For without them, we could not even be held responsible for our actions, because they would not be our actions. David Hume made this point of view:

Where [actions] proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good; nor infamy, if evil....The person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant...it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. (Hume & Steinberg, 1995, p. 593)

Further, determinism is not controlled by other agents. Compatibilists argue that determinism by itself does not necessarily imply that any other person or agent is controlling our behaviour or manipulating us. In this vein, Daniel Dennett has argued that nature is not an agent. What is reprehensible about control by other agents, Dennett argues, whether they be behavioral engineers or con men, is that other people are using us as means to their ends, lording it over us and making us conform to their wishes. But determinism is not about this. New compatibilists like Harry Frankfurt believe that classical compatibilism, the view of Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and others is deficient because they give us only a view of freedom of action, but not an adequate view of freedom of will (Pink, 2011, p. 541). On this view, this arises because too much attention was given to external constraints on freedom such as physical restraint, coercion or threats and physical disabilities, and too little attention to constraints internal to our wills, such as addictions, phobias, obsessions, neuroses, and other kinds of

compulsive behaviour. Freedom to do what we want is also impaired if we are addicted to drugs or have irrational fears of heights, an obsessive need to wash our hands, neurotic anxieties, and so on. These restrictions are important not only because they affect our freedom to do what we want, but our freedom to will what we want. To cover this range of freedom, Frankfurt introduces a distinction between first-order and second-order desires. Second-order desires are desires about other desires. For example, a drug addict may have a first-order desire to use a drug. He definitely wants it badly. But he has another desire that the (first order) desire for the drug not move him to actually use the drug. Because this second-order is a desire that the first-order desire for the drug not be “effective in action,” Frankfurt also calls it second-order volition (Zhu, 2004, p. 262). Frankfurt believes that the ability to have higher-order desires and volitions is one of the things that make us human. To be more specific, it makes us persons or selves. Non-rational animals also have desires or wants and even purposes. But what makes us different is that we are capable of thinking about what kinds of desires and purposes we have and ought to have. In other words, persons or selves are capable of “reflective self-evaluation,” of reflecting upon and perhaps changing the desires and purposes they do have rather than merely acting instinctively on their desires. In this sense, what an unwilling drug addict lacks, according to Frankfurt, is freedom of will because he cannot make his will (his first-order desire for the drug) conform to his second-order volition to resist taking the drug. Thus, the unwilling addict lacks the will that he wants to have, and therefore lacks free will. And yet Frankfurt is a thoroughgoing compatibilist (Weber, 2001, p. 221). For once it is admitted and granted that one has the free will to want what he or she wants, then without any shadow of doubt, determinism can coexist with free will. In fact, it would not even be required of free will that the agent “could have done otherwise.” The compatibilist position has dispelled a great deal of difficulties surrounding human freedom as a result of the deterministic conception of the world and life. One fundamental concession it granted to the skeptic is that we cannot have absolute control over our lives, and what is more, it is not even desirable because it is upon that basis that blame and praise can be imputed to us. Compatibilism has been opposed despite its tenability by theories like libertarianism which is the view

that we have freewill but the freewill is not compatible with determinism. Another opposing theory to compatibilism is incompatibilism which William James also labeled as hard determinism. It is the view that freewill is incompatible with the world being deterministic. Proponents of this theory believe that man lacks freewill because the world is deterministic. However, compatibilism remains a solid contribution to the perennial problem of the compatibility of freedom and determinism.

CONCLUSION

Despite the abnormalities and obvious shortcomings in Sartre's notion of absolute freedom, this idea is not to be utterly discarded. For Sartre, every man has an uncultivated future which he is expected to explore out of his own freewill. His philosophy is an embodiment of action, optimism, courage and hope for man. This is because it is an existential resolve that showcases that man alone is the architect that gives meaningful design to his life. His philosophy opens a horizon of scheme in which man has much opportunity at his disposal to contribute his quota to the course of ideas and values. This allows man full participation in his own affairs. This type of philosophy will whip up in man a sense of importance, putting him on a high pedestal in the social structure; it accords man with a dignity higher than that of animals. Invariably it means that we are responsible for whatever achievements or failures we encounter in life. Freedom, choice and responsibility formulate a triplicate of inseparably interconnected ingredients of man, in order to make a meaningful and harmonious impact in existence. Sartre's philosophy accords man with the dignity he deserves. He does not make man an object like previous philosophies have done. His aim was to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world. Man sometimes lives an inauthentic life by engaging in bad faith. More often than not, we relegate our own values to the background in order to behave like the crowd or the so-called 'enlightened' which is what Sartre tried to correct in man. He wants us to realize that we are the architect of our own life; he tries to make us understand that our destiny is in our own hands; but he pushed the notion of freedom to the extreme. It is also the existence of human freedom that makes moral responsibility possible and a man therefore is held responsible not only for his actions but also for the consequences

of his actions. This is what makes an orderly human society which is why we cannot embrace determinism also in its entirety. Sartre also failed to take into cognizance our limitation as mortals. For the mere fact that as individuals, we are not responsible for our freedom; we just find ourselves free; it is a confirmation of our mortality; and we should realize that as mortals, we are limited and cannot have anything in the absolute sense and thus, we cannot have absolute freedom as human beings.

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