ISSN: 2349-2147

Modern Research Studies

An International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences
An Indexed & Refereed e-Journal
www.modernresearch.in

Title: Mediterranean Odysseus: A Political Economy Outlook on Roles of Afro-European Relations to African Mass Migration in the 21st Century and the Broad Effects

Author/s: IBRAHIM B. ANOBA
AKINTOLA F. AKINSANYA
OLADAPO T. JELILI

Volume 2, Issue 4
December 2015

pp. 821–841.

Email: editor@modernresearch.in
mrsejournal@gmail.com

ISSN: 2349-2147

Modern Research Studies:
An International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences

Mediterranean Odysseus: A Political Economy Outlook on Roles of Afro-European Relations to African Mass Migration in the 21st Century and the Broad Effects

IBRAHIM B. ANOBA*
anobasenior@rocketmail.com

AKINTOLA F. AKINSANYA*
akintolaspeaks003@yahoo.com

OLADAPO T. JELILI*
oladapojelili@gmail.com

*Department of Political Science
Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria

Abstract: Man in history is portrayed to be one whose numerous wants are insatiable and always pursue improvements in every aspect of his life; what does run in front is 'survival', and man will go any length to ensure he continues to preserve his existence, causing his movements from place to place to fulfill this desire. This pastoral consciousness is however escalating in present day Africa and overwhelming its closest neighbour (Europe). Analysts and observers alike continue to adopt trade-centric and sociological approaches in debating the aforementioned which deprives the discourse, required perspective. Mass African migration in the 21st century requires an understanding of the political and the socio-economic situation, especially on its causes and effects on Afro-European relations. In inquest to the foregoing, this work presents the historicity of economic and political relationships between postcolonial Africa and Europe as stimuli for imbalanced development which inter alia necessitated mass migration of Africans to Europe in the 21st century.

Keywords: Migration, Africa, Europe, economic development, Afro-European relations.

Introduction

The political spectrum of state and non-state interplay faces far greater litmus tests because of dynamics in socio-economic and political developments in the 21st century more than previous centuries as it predominantly concerns mass migrations, economic redefinitions and global insecurity. One of such interplays is the one between Africa and Europe. Both continent according to history share more than colonialism. Apart from the geographical and political connectivity, economic relations hold a bigger portion of the relationship, and as Strickrodt (2015) aptly observed, from 1550 to colonial partition in the mid-1880s, trade was central to Afro-European relations as on the Western Slave Coast. There is also a socio-cultural connectivity as religious originations and interchanges in the arts, speak volume.

The contents of historic agreements between the two have affected both continents especially on the economic front. Europe has developed tremendously within 1964 to 2014. Industrialisation and technological innovations has triggered economic advancements and administrative institution functions properly compared to Africa where the series of agreements between the two continents has adversely affected the economy considering equitable underdevelopment of its people vis-à-vis what is obtainable in Europe. The result of negative economic positioning of Africa has influenced hardship on the continent. Poverty and unemployment are wrecking human survival; imported political administrative structures in colonially arranged statehoods are instigating political and civil unrests across the continent; and natural mishaps are upsetting geographic originality in Africa; the consequence is a prodigiously unprecedented cross-continent migration of Africans mainly across the Mediterranean into Europe.

Obviously, high African migration in the current global migrant crisis is overwhelming Europe as overstretching of institutions and agencies by the influx from other parts of the world especially from Syria and Yemen limits her capacity. On the one hand is the present Europe, struggling to keep up with some internal economic crisis. Inclination of hundreds of migrants from Africa is compounding pressure on the European Union (EU) as most of the receiving states' economies – Greece, Hungary, Macedonia and the likes – find it hard to ameliorate the imported populations into their expanding burden. It is a weight too big for European economies, which is poised to finding capacities to see off competitions in the global market from emerging super economies especially from oriental Asia and the Americas. Condemned on the other hand, to rebuild her post-welfare states, is Africa, as dictated by recent international agreements; at the same time she is finding means to keep its population within borders; it is the sorry state Africa finds herself. Literarily expressing a resemblance is Homer in *Odysseus*:

> We are Achaians coming from Troy, beaten off our true course by winds from every direction across the great gulf of the open sea, making for home, by the wrong way, on the wrong courses. So we have come. So it has pleased Zeus to arrange it. (Homer 1996, 9.259-262)

Here, Odysseus, in similarity with Africans, tries to win compassion from Polyphemos, the Cyclops (EU), by pointing out that it was not of his doing that he came to his shores (Europe). Succeeding sections will further illustrate cases in affirmation of this fictional comparison.

Migration as a Concept

The concept of migration is difficult to describe agreeably as it inculcates movements of 'different' people across 'different' places for 'different' reasons across geographical locations in varying times. Migration is a process by which an individual or a group shifts residence from one population or place to another that often times implies the disruption of work and social life. A migrant is the person involved in the process of migration, the one who moves from an immediate place to another for safety or food, and as Jrank.org, (a social encyclopaedia) says:

> A migrant is someone who breaks off activities and associations in one place and recognises their daily life in another place. A move within the same area is considered mobility, not migration, because the mover can continue day-to-day life without significant disruption. A migrant can be a slave seeking better life; an economic mover in search of better job; a person fleeing war or violence; a person rendered to leave locations because of natural disasters; someone who moves from a specific location to another; or someone who is fleeing an area for political reasons. (Jank.org 2015)

Migration is a major factor that shapes the historical dimensions of human relations, a vocal expression of spatial flows that defines societies, cultures, demographics and economics. Ernest Ravenstein, regarded as one of the earliest migration theorists in his 1988 defining work *Laws of Migration* adopted census data from Wales and England in studying population and migration. He found that:

- the primary cause of migration was better economic opportunities;
- the volume of migration decreases as distance increases;
- migration occurs in stages instead of one long move;
- population movements are bilateral; and that
- migration differentials including age, class and gender influence a person's mobility.

He submitted that unfavourable conditions in an area "push" people out and favourable conditions in another area "pull" them in, meaning that migration is governed by a "push-pull" process. What is germane to the argument is that people seek betterment in foreign land for different reasons and these reasons are mostly economical and relatively political. This revelation underscores the importance of adopting a political economic appraisal of Afro-European migration as is presented in this work.

Timeline of Afro-European Economic Relations

Colonisation of Africa during the late 19th and early 20th centuries witnessed the penetration of African communalism by European capitalist agenda. Colonialism bureaucratically re-orientated existing African administrative systems and laid foundations for factors that instigated mass migration of Africans in the 21st century, chief of which is economic. The exploitative intentions of colonialism cannot however be over emphasised here, as we will later in this section exemplify how successive Afro-Europe agreements were marred by neo-colonial notions. As widely noted, Neo-colonialism persists in the Afro-Europe relations of today in a rearticulated dimension; yet, in all ramifications, Europe remains Africa's biggest partner. The vagaries in the formal agreements between both continents economically trickle down on the average African negatively, which inform desires to seek refuge in better economies. This makes the nexus between the two more awkwardly connected. Globalisation is a proof to the virtual impossibility of avoiding inter-presence of state and non-state actors' interests in state policies; these interests in the international system are always affecting even economies far away, through politicked investors-networked interests or in affirmation of the capitalist market order. This makes neo-colonialism an unavoidable adversary in Afro-European relations.

Afro-European relations recorded a distinct swerve immediately after World War II. The West consensually came together to establish institutions to foster international cooperation among member states. On the one hand was the political United Nations Organisation (UNO), formed in 1945 with the purpose of preventing another world war through limitations and resolutions of international disputes, while on the other hand was the economic World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively established in 1944 and 1945, and later the London and Paris clubs. All would later prove to be West-centric platforms, at least in their preceding two decades, as Africa's economic existence was occasionally influenced through these agents, parts of which were the excessive loans provided to Africa especially coming from the 1970s that subsequently pressured on government revenues. It left little to be done back home as debt servicing widened and did effectively incapacitated many businesses.

Timeline of Afro-Europe Relations:

- Treaty of Rome 1957
- First Yaoundé 1964-1969
- Second Yaoundé 1971-1975
- Lomé I 1975
- Lomé II 1981
- Lomé III 1985
- Lomé IV 1990
- Cotonou 2000-2020
- JAES 2007

The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Commission (EEC) out of fiscal necessities. In 1958, the EEC created the European Development Fund (EDF), a major formal multilateral nexus between postcolonial Africa and industrialising Europe. Economic ties strengthened between the two with funds transfer to Africa, though most EDF resources remained internally dispatched within the EEC, but Africa was getting something back from its looted fortunes. France as the major colonial state among the group of six in the EEC influenced the EDF's distribution and allocation of funds for Africa mostly to Francophone African colonies (Gruhn 1993), territories she influences to date. It was a major exclusion for other independent African countries considering the destructs of independence struggles i.e., in former Portuguese colonies where independence came at stiff front, indigenous governments fought to play catch-ups, likewise in former British colonies, since Britain did not join the EEC until 1973.

The preferential treatments for former French colonies increased when 18 former colonies, all French except for Madagascar, came together in 1963 to form the Association of African States and Madagascar (AASM), and signed an agreement with the EEC. The agreement included arrangements to give Europe unabated access to African farms and mines underscoring two things: the EEC's desire to rid Africa of her reserves and the parochialism of governments in independent African states. The agreement did improve the EDF's financial scheme for Africa with a more robust technical assistance. It was nevertheless smashed when the African party to the agreements could not further withstand the imperial underlinings.

With African states' desire to re-enact their relationship with Europe, they commenced a renegotiation process with the EEC and a subsequent agreement was signed in June 1963 in Yaoundé, Cameroun, known as the Yaoundé Convention. The Yaoundé Convention was of mixed effects, first as former British colonies failed to agree to the convention leaving the overall credibility of the agreement in reservation, and second, by granting tariff preferences to African states but with no system of export subsidies or funds stabilisation (Gruhn 1976, 251). The Yaoundé Convention lasted until 1969 since it had a validity period of five years. A positive achievement, however, was that Afro-Europe relations took a rather near balanced weight as EDF funds assisted many African economies before the 1970 oil shocks derailed Africa's progression for EDF fundings did fell; another was the ability of indigenous African governments to adopt socialist reforms as was with Tanzania's Ujaama and Libya's Jamahiriya. The former was relatively successful while the latter made Libya's economy one of the best globally as it remained competitive until 2011.

On the aggregate, the first Yaoundé convention was not efficient enough in integrating Africa into the global mainframe as internal instabilities limited progression and reinstated mass poverty and economic incapacitations, with a rehash of imbalances of the previous; a second Yaoundé Convention was signed in 1969 with 20 African states in attestation and became effective in January 1971. Evrensel (2007) noted that the second Yaoundé convention initiated a much broader cooperation and led to the Lomé convention of 1975. The Lomé I was agreed in 1975 by 46 countries that formed the Africa Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) group – the ACP was an EEC case for treating the third world as one. The EEC committed around ECU 3 billion to aid and investment in the ACP countries. The convention increased aid and improved some trade agreements, for example, the SYSMIN (mining) addition to the Stabilisation of Export Earnings (STABEX) scheme, a form of reimbursement to ACP countries for price inconsistencies for their exports.

The Lomé I improved to Lomé II (1981) and Lomé III (1985). All did produced modest changes i.e., the Lomé II augmented aid and investment expenditure to ECU 5.5 billion while Lomé III raised it to ECU 8.5 billion, including trade provisions and aid. The Lomé III however, extended to Lomé IV. The Lomé IV was signed in December 1989 and took effects in 1990; it further increased the package for the ACP to ECU 12 billion. It is the most long-standing cooperation preserved in the convention and updated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. It emphasised newness but was hit during the oil shocks, albeit the biased arrangements by European technocrats (Reginald 1980, 3-35). The agreement intentions were to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Agenda and the gradual integration of the ACPs into the global economic spectrum. It covers development cooperation, the economic, trade cooperation, and some political arrangements.

Back in Africa, in the period between 1973 and 1980, former colonies faced the challenge of building strong institutions as the inherited colonial structures failed to work with Africans in command. Famine, and persistent political instability coupled with poor agricultural yield affected Africa's foreign exchange and the over-accelerating population growth vis-à-vis GDP levels which inter alia were escalating as pressure was mounting on foreign export. The instabilities in the African economy during this period contributed to the decreased interest of Africans in investing heavily in their economy prompting an increase of African investments in foreign countries especially Europe. Local markets lost value and jobs were lost to corruption-ridden administrations.

In 2007, 80 African and European heads-of-state signed the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The strategy provided a comprehensive structure for relations between the new African Union (AU) and the EU on equal bases and common interests (Hart 2011) as equal participation and representation were considered a prerequisite for a result-oriented agreement. The aims of the JAES was to fortify Africa-EU partnership in areas affecting both parties such as good governance and respect for human rights; by committing a joint effort into addressing global common challenges such as insecurity and climate change; ensuring participation of the private sectors and civil societies in creating a people oriented partnership. Implemented through action plans, the JAES was a correcting pen for the already derailing African economy.

The EEC/EU, as observed above, historically contributes to the current economic incapacitation of African governments' effectiveness to promote development strategies such as the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) and the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), which were constructed to promote basic improvements in quality of life through a series of biased, preferential, exploitative and subjugating agreements and policies it had with Africa. These agreements coupled with the African miseries of corruption and political instabilities make the EU more or less a party to the current disturbance at its borders. We can deduce that Africa had comprehensive development interventions to work with. Moreover, despite her involvements with the EEC/EU, African economy has yet to harmonise with propositions in these schemes. Definitely, something could be wrong with Africa.

In the succeeding section, we navigate through identified problems stimulating mass migration in Africa.

Propellants of Mass Migration in Africa

There are divergent analyses in explaining the status quo. Some sections believe that migration is a result of deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions in Africa, as echoed earlier, while others hold that migration is just personal will without any form of imported influence i.e., migration is only to seek experience and trainings or for betterment of social life. Meanwhile, Internalists argue that Africa is responsible for her own socio-economic predicaments, which is a reality check for Africa. However, the more accepted argument is of the Externalist: they affirm that the present quandary is a result of successive submerging of African economic prospects by imperial agreements. The current overwhelming migration on Europe solidifies this argument. What stands out between the two is that, mass migration of Africans to Europe has roots in the growing disparities of the fundamental principles of development as far back as colonialism, and these causes have political, economic, social and demographic dimensions. Here are a few examples:

I. **Coups and Civil Wars**: Africa in the last 60 years has been an abode of civil wars, which has claimed millions of lives and rendered tribes homeless. Recent socio-political turmoil in some African countries within the last decade also triggered a rise in the number of cross-border refugees, and according to a 2014 UNHCR report, the figure is around 15.1 million. Post-colonial Africa has experienced more than 70 military coups (successful and failed) since 1960. Civil wars have in the same vein contributed a great deal to the figure. A case is the D.R Congo war of 2001 that displaced hundreds of thousands of people prompting an increase in number of refugees in neighbouring countries of Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi, countries already politically weakened. With the overwhelming incapacities of receiving countries to accommodate the figures, displaced persons were compelled to seek haven outside the continent. It was the case with Côte d'Ivoire (2002), Guinea-Bissau (2003) and scores of other cases. In Rwanda, communal feud of 1994 resulted in the massacre of over 800,000 Tutsis prompting up to a million people to flee their homes in search of security. The Arab-spring that rocked northern Africa in 2011 is another example. It severely contributed to the alarming figures of displaced persons, especially in Libya (ongoing) and Egypt. It caused great outrush of refugees to Europe, mainly to some parts of Spain, Italy and Greece with hearth touching Odysseys in the Mediterranean, and as Anoba (2015) laments:

> The figures of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Africa are staggering as it runs into millions. Somalia has over 1 million internally displaced persons due to civil war in the east African country, Sudan has around 6 million IDPs coming from decades of civil war especially between the north and south, which saw the country eventually split up, and the case of the

> disheartening Darfur conflict. In Nigeria, there are close to a million IDPs owing to violence and terrorism in the northeast of the country and in the Central African Republic, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that close to 1 million are IDPs resulting from political crisis in the country. (575)

These series of conflicts are massively dropping grenades on societal harmony across Africa and people will be condemned to flee from place to place in search of refuge, and on the long-run when chaos reigns everywhere, odysseys becomes imminent across the Mediterranean.

II. **Insurgency and Terrorism**: In the millennium, numerous African countries have been in battle against insurgency and terrorism. It has led to thousands of deaths with great economic effects. Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon are in a multinational effort to rid their region of the deadly Boko Haram sect responsible for thousands of deaths and numbers of kidnappings in the region. Kenya and Somalia still struggle to curb the horrific acts of the Al-Qaeda linked Al-Shabab, a group responsible for series of attacks in both countries. These are just a few of series of conflicts that have contributed vastly to the level of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa and leaving intended sustainable infrastructures both physical and administrative severely affected. Villages and communities are sacked and inhabitants compelled to find safety elsewhere.

III. **Political Instabilities:** African governments function by means far from modern standards as bases of state structures are usually along tribal lines and ethnic superiority, instead of unified national consciousness. In some African countries, most populated tribes control political power for decades while minority groups are subjugated, the side-lined groups in foul-cry wages violent protests, that often times led wars, and then to sporadic regime change which effectively disrupts intended national development plans. It drags states into prolonged group indifferences, as is the case with Sudan-South Sudan, Eritrea-Ethiopia, and Somalia-Somaliland.

Many African leaders have put their countries into chaos by overstaying constitutionally provided periods. The constitution and state institutions are penetrated in order to create an uneven playfield against the opposition, which according to African history, leads to civil unrests. The Tsvangarai-Mugabe feud almost disrupted Zimbabwe as was the case in Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and in DR Congo with Joseph Kabila. This unprecedented quest for eternal power transcends to the polls as the incumbent mostly tries to rig elections and in the process spark public unrest, while the incumbent hunt and charge opposition figures with disruption of national peace and in some cases treason. Violence sets in and people are forced to flee their homes into neighbouring countries, and when figures become overwhelming, repatriation threats lead many onto the path of seeking asylum in Europe. The subject of political instability in Africa relates with the migration question. The hot political and economic conditions on the continent contribute enormously to the massive exodus of both highly qualified and lowly educated populations in Africa.

IV. **Poor Economy and Poverty**: Economic factors play a crucial role in the status quo as noted in the introductory section. It is no news that Africa has the highest number of poverty in the world. In 2006, 34 out of the 54 nations on the UN list of least developed countries were African countries; also in 2009, 22 of 24 African countries were identified as having low human development by the UNHCR. Across Africa, annual GDP per capital is less than $5200, with the vast majority of the population living on much less money. According the World Bank poverty in Africa has hit 42.7% in 2012 (World Bank 2012). Unemployment rate in Africa vis-à-vis the youth population is poorest globally i.e., D.R Congo's 46.1% and Kenya's 40%. African unemployment remains highest in the world, with about 75% according to trading economies, with 60% of its population between ages 15 and 25. In face of recent poor economic competitiveness and a 5.5% population growth, figures of migrants are likely to grow. Africa's population is increasing arithmetically – it increased from 229 million in 1950 to 630 million in 1990; currently it is estimated at 1.2 billion (UNICEF 2014) while the available resources are not adequate to accommodate expansions.

With 75% of the world's poor, Africa is the world's poorest continent. In 2010 alone around 240 million in sub-Saharan Africa were hungry and about 40% of the total population of the continent was frequently unable to obtain sufficient food daily (Anoba 2015). The average per capita income inflation-adjusted in sub-Saharan African excluding South Africa is $315 according to a 2001 Forbes survey, lower than it was in 1960. With a population more than twice of the US, its income is way shy of Belgium, a country the size of Republic of Benin.

V. **Climate Change and Negatives of a Modernising World:** Africa contributes least to climate change but pays dearest for its consequences. The sporadic rise in global humidity and torrential rainfalls as prompted by global warming is drying up rivers and lakes across Africa and flooding farms and houses. With governments doing less or nothing, natural instincts lead Africans to flee their homelands across the Mediterranean. Around 4 million farm animals are at risk of hunger and starvation especially in areas closest to the Sahara – Mauritania, Sudan, Somalia and the likes. These natural discrepancies largely contribute to the growing migrant figures. Prior to 1800 the world was way isolated than what is of the present world. Economic and political comparisons were not as benchmarked as the present; people endured local deficiencies and kept faith with the welfare state to resolving itself. But the liberalisation of the modern world in the 20th century considerably reduced the spatial differences all over, and as mobility was eased, so were parameters for economic and social comparisons, stamping a big gap between the industrialising Europe and postcolonial Africa. Technological differences became obvious especially as it defines human growth and survival; global minimum benchmarks also became a yardstick for government performance and mounted pressure on modernising Africa. With governments' inability to fully integrate African societies into the modernising trend, disparities obviously arise and heavy migration is a consequence.

Effects on 'Developing Africa' and Long-Term Afro-European Relations

Scholarly experiments on the dynamics of Afro-European relationships are mostly trade-centric; it prompted Mangala (2010) to opine that most scholarly endeavours tend to approach the relationship from the perspective of a single issue – trade, and relatively from development cooperation and human rights. The complexities of the relationship have nonetheless grown beyond experiences to strategic partnerships sequel to the changing demands of our world. The adoption of the JAES attests to the changing relationship. Economic analyses of the implications of migration for the low-income African countries appear to be scarce because data on migration in Africa are poor. It seems that immigration has helped boost employment and the economies abroad, i.e., foreign construction workers have been essential to the timely completion of infrastructure projects, and it is of general acceptability that several factories would have to shut down without guest African workers (Hein 2004).

By contrast, this same immigration has been a subject of controversy in South Africa. Studies of sectors with large numbers of irregular migrants show a consistent violation of labour standards and wages below the legal minimum (Black 2004). The Human Rights Watch in 2006 also claim that workers on commercial farms, documented or not, are subject to violations of basic employment law protections. Undoubtedly, most countries in Africa with large chunks of migrants in Europe are heavily dependent on remittances. A survey of households in the Senegal River valley (crossing Mali, Senegal and Mauritania) showed that migrant remittances provided 65% of cash income, probably including remittances from internal migrants (Findley 2004).

A few studies do incorporate estimates of what migrants would have earned had they stayed at home, and thus provide a more accurate perspective on the impact of migration decisions. For an example, Lachaud in 1999 estimated that international remittances to Burkina Faso reduced the headcount measure of poverty by 7.2% in rural areas and 3.2% in cities. The fall in the headcount ratio is statistically significant only for subsistence farmers, for the unemployed, and for the self-employed in urban areas. Adams (2006) finds that remittances reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty in Ghana. International remittances do result in a small rise in the headcount level of poverty, indicating that for income declines near the poverty line, remittances are slightly smaller than the estimated earnings of migrants had they not left.

The inference of all this is that the 'Migradollar' from the migrants contribute immensely through a number of channels as explicated above from sustenance strategies of receiving households as well as agents of local and national development. Several studies have attempted to measure the impact of remittances on poverty or expenditures. Some simply measure the increment to household income from receiving remittances. Remittances are thus manna from heaven, and no attempts were made to take into account what the migrant would have earned had he or she remained at home. For instance, Litchfield and Waddington (2004) find that controlling for other determinants of income, Ghanaian households whose head had migrated spent on average $78 per adult equivalent per annum more than households whose head had not migrated. By 1998/99, households with migrated heads spent only $39 than non-migrants. Gustafsson and Makkonen (1993), based on a 1986/87 household survey, find that remittances are the main source of income for 35% of Lesotho households, and that in the absence of remittances consumption per capita would fall by 35%.

The economic incapacitations of most African governments especially in sub-Saharan Africa, as a result of most of the conventional spillages in the Afro-Europe relations, puts Africa's economy in a position where it leaves its citizens with no choice other than to seek refuge abroad. Afro-European economic transaction has seen over 100 billion dollars addition to the European economy in recent decades as evident in the persistent development of Europe from the post Yaoundé era while Africa only played an economically fuelling role by supplying European industries with materials in return for exploitative agreements and subjugating economic reforms. Alternatively, Asia and the Americas are proving a rewarding partner to Africa as observers have affirmed; Africa stands a better chance for economic growth if it could partner comprehensively with both regions.

Despite the above, one central question remains controversial as to whether brain drain has a positive or negative impact on the economies of African countries. For instance, migration studies conducted in different parts of the world to assess the impact and effects of intellectual migration have generated contradictory results. One divergent school of thought believes that brain drain have detrimental effects arising from the loss of the brightest minds from Africa to Europe, hence weakening the capacity for development. Their argument is basically hinged on the fact that the brightest minds to develop the continent whose foundational development, economically speaking, were sponsored by the national governments were being migrated to Europe to add value to another land. On the other hand, the convergence school of thought argue that the problem of brain drain has been blown out of proportion and dramatized. They tend to emphasize the beneficial outcomes of migration for both sending and receiving countries. Whatever the argument of both schools the fact remains that brain drain tends to pull the best and brightest from Africa to Europe, the very minds to help develop the living conditions at home. Hence, slow death for Africa.

Over the years, ties have grown between the two regions, and there are different approaches to the strategic partnership between the two regions. However, the liberal theory of complex interdependence stands out in explaining EU-Africa growing sectorial cooperation on a number of issues including migration, environment, and peace and security (Mangala 2010). It has compelled the two sides to find commonly agreed upon solutions, which do not necessarily correspond to the realist logic of immediate self-interest. Koulaimah-Gabriel (1997) notes:

> The end of the Cold War clearly deprived the African continent of its strategic position in international politics and of its bargaining power in relation to the Northern donors. There is, however, another entry point for Africa in the international arena, as it is an important

> stakeholder in the so-called “new interdependencies”. There has been a growing awareness that certain problems have a global reach and that they cannot be solved at a country or regional level … the geographical proximity between Africa and Europe makes the common management of these interdependencies all the more desirable. (19)

The EU has emerged as Africa’s most important economic partner with exportation of merchandise amounting to €91.1 billion and importation reaching €125.6 billion in 2005, and as Mangala (2010) affirmed, the EU’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) accounts for 60% of the total ODA going to Africa, reaching €48 billion in 2006. In this sense, the EU unequivocally stressed the essentiality of the African economic prosperity for EU prosperity. Sequel to the foregoing, it is without doubt the element of choice of destination to African migrants is mostly Europe. Perhaps the strong ties are sentimentally playing a role. Our concern here is to examine the economic effects of this migration. The effects of migration on the two regions in terms of political economic dimension are no doubt reshaping migration trends. The argument of most countries in Europe is that the influx of migrants will take jobs, threaten social cohesion, and rise welfare spending. Political economists express both negative and positive views. On a positive note, they generally agree that immigration is mostly good for a nation termed ‘immigration surplus’, which encourages new demand for goods and services and employers to hire more people.

Nonetheless, unemployment levels in some parts of Eastern Europe are high and governments in conjunction with the EU are finding possible remedies to reduce the figure, the impacts of the influx of mass migrants from Africa will be devastating on the job market as weaker European economies will struggle to balance the podium. As Europe battles with competition between native workers and new arrivals coupled with three features of many European economies today – prejudice, austerity, and labour insecurity, Africa is also primed with the issue of brain drain among other things.

Conclusion

From the argument above, we can summarise that Africa's migration rate would be on a rise; it has both internal and imported causes and consequences and; it is overwhelming the European countries. It should be noted that in the contemporary world, spatial integration makes it easier for people to choose where to live and seek better life, but some places hold comparative advantages over others due to economic and safety reasons identified earlier, which means preference would be on the favourable. It is to this effect that economically inferior African states must create new strategies in preventing mass migration. As noted in the middle of the analysis, socialist welfare schemes have limited Africa's development prospects and so are the imported capitalist reforms. What should be in consideration in whatever alternative Africa might choose is to create an active middle-class that will serve as buffer-zone. It will narrow the economic gap and promote employment – meaning a large tax base, which will in turn enable the continent to build good schools and hospitals and provide constant electricity among other basic needs. What African governments do not realise or deliberately ignore is that, Africans who migrate to Europe are contributing more to European development since more than 75% of them are below 40 years; this leaves the homeland with an ageing population whose economic values are limited. Governments are nevertheless, condemned to reshuffle their strategies as not doing enough will continue to cost Africa tangible development points. In other words, the solutions to Africa's plight are Africans and solutions are not in places but in people. As the didactic Odysseus will say to Poseidon:

> Hear me my lord whoever you are … I now come to your current and to your knees after much suffering. Pity me then, my lord. I call myself your supplicant'. He spoke, and the river stayed its current, stopped the waves breaking, and made all quiet in front of him and let him get safely into the outlet of the river. (Homer 1996, 5.445-454)

There is however, a clear certainty, which is that there are no straitjacket solutions at all. We believe that the only way of managing the migration problem would be for Africa to revisit her economic arrangements and address identified problems discussed earlier to proceed to a level where solutions will not be farfetched. African governments must know that the motives driving African migrants to Europe for better life did not happen overnight. Therefore, Africans must start looking inward in terms of promoting the rule of law, prioritizing and fast-tracking socio-economic development.

References:

Adams, Richard. 2006. "Remittances in Poverty in Ghana." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3838*. Accessed November 22, 2015. http://worldbank.org/remittances-in-poverty-in-ghana

Anoba, Ibrahim. 2015. "Understanding Africa Socio-Economic Emergencies in the Face of Rising Foreign Aid and the Structural Political Alternative." *Modern Research Studies: An International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2.3*: 523-540.

Black, Richard. 2004. *Migration and Pro-Poor Policies in Africa*: *Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty*. Brighton: University of Sussex Press.

Evrensel, Ayşe Y. 2007. *Development Policy of the EU toward the ACP Countries: Effectiveness of Preferential Trade Arrangements and Aid.* Unpublished. Accessed November 22, 2015. http://aei.pitt.edu/7815/1/evrensel-a-05g.pdf

Findley, Sally E. 2004. *Mali: Seeking Opportunity Abroad*. Washington, D.C: Migration Policy Institute.

Gruhn, Isebill V. 1976. "The Lomé Convention: Inching towards Independence." *International Organisation for Foreign Affairs, 30*: 240-262.

---. 1993. *The Evolution of European-African Relation.* Santa Clara: University of California Press.

Gustafsson, B & N. Makkonen. 1993. "Poverty and Remittances in Lesotho." *Journal of African Economies, 2(1)*: 49-73.

Hart, Rachael. 2011. "Changing Relations between Europe and Africa." Open Society Foundations. Accessed October 18, 2015. http://opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/changing-relation-between-europe-africa

Heisel, D. F. 1982. "Theories of International Migration." *International Migration in the Arab World.* Proceedings of an ECWA Population Conference in Nicosia. Beirut: UNECWA.

Homer. 1996. *The Odyssey*. Translated by Robert Fagles, introduction by Bernard Knox. United States of America: Penguin.

Human Rights Watch. 2006. "Unprotected Migrants: Zimbabweans in South Africa's Limpopo Province." *Report on Zimbabwe's Human Right Violations*. Volume 18, No. 6(A). NY: Human Rights Watch. Accessed October 18, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/southafrica0806/southafrica0806webwcover.pdf

Jank.org. 2015. "Migration – Theories of Migration." Accessed October 23, 2015. http://family.jank.org/pages/1170/migration.html

Koulaimah-Gabriel, A. 1997. "Beyond Lomé IV: Future Challenges to EU Africa Relations." *Rectel Journal, 6*: 14-22.

Lachaud, Jean-Pierre. 1999. "Envoi de Fonds, Inegalite et Pauvreté au Burkina Faso." *Tiers-Monde, 40.160*: 793-827.

Litchfield, Julie, and Hugh Waddington. 2004. "Migration and Poverty in Ghana: Evidence from the Ghana Living Standards Survey." *Sussex Migration Working Paper No. 10*. Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research.

Mohamoud, Abdullah A. 2005. *Reversing Brain Drain in Africa, Harnessing the Intellectual Capital of the Diaspora for Knowledge and Development in Africa*. Amsterdam: Sahan.

Mangala, Jack. 2010. "The European Union and Africa: Old Partners in a Changing World." In *Africa and the New World Era*, edited by Jack Mangala, 167-191. New York: Palgrave.

Ravenstein, Ernest G. 1885. *Laws of Migration*. Santa Barbara: Centre for Spatially Integrated Social Science. 1983.

Reginald, Green. 1980. "The Child of Lomé: Messiah, Monster or Mouse?" *The Political Economy of EEC Relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific States*, edited by Frank Long. Oxford: Perganon Press.

Strickrodt, Silke. 2015. *Afro-European Trade in the Atlantic World*. New York: James Curry.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2015. "Regional Operations Profile – Africa." Accessed October 20, 2015. http://unhcr.org/pages/4a02d7fd6.html

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 2014. "Africa's Population Could Hit 4 Billion by 2100." *Human Development Report*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.

World Bank Group. 2012. "Poverty Headcount Ratio at $1.90 a Day (2011 PPP)." Accessed October 15, 2015. http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty